o/F($-")e(")dn -S > o as tr(i) < o, (2.2) equality if h(0) < 0. For the newcomer Ehe criterion is that the marginal benefit of additional search must be at least as great as Ehe exEra search cosE, given that Ehe reservation price is less than marginal ucility. In concrast, the old customer is moEivated to search only if the expecEed difference in cosE is less Ehan Ehe price change in his current store. Substituting (2.1) into (2.2) the opEimal reservacion Price turns ou! Eo be 0=x
h(0) < 0, equalicy if h($)< 0. ( 
2.3)
We call 0 the reservation price variability if t' = f<. For any u = &, there is no further searchl the cuscomer remains loyal for one tnore period. Clearly' it is in rhe incerest of a firm to qanage its Price policy such tha!, ceteris .E!8, u i3 as small as possible in order to minimize the loss of customers.
Since individuals and their reservation Prl.ces differ, the denand facing a particular firn is based on a distribuEion on p and u of old cusEomers and Potential neecomers. Arbitrarily associaEing one unit of the good \rith each person the Potential demand for a firmrs commodity x arises from a trt-variafe density function dx,p,u) which is assuned to be identically and independently distributed over time. Dealing with continuoua time r{re let u = dp/dt. The f irm sets price p a! a rate u. The quancity demanded by cuscomets whoge. reservation price and varisnce are at least equal to $ and 0, respe"tirrely, is Ehe It is assuDed that the density g is nornal and Ehat C ls at ooat a polynonial of second order in x. Thue, the highest terlr in EtC(x)l is C"var(xlp,u). Sinqe in lhis case the valiance is independent of p snd ur, the partials Co and C, reduce to the cerEaincy equivaLents C'D1 and C'D2, respectively.
Aa is the conventl. r(r) = /r"-6(E-")urds > o, (3.5) where V1 = o1(P + D/Dl -c') by the assumPtions of Seccion II. The is smaller than that of the \ = 0 curve if V12 < 0, as shown in Fig. ] . The oprimal stationary paEh chus cuLs the stalionary u = 0 curve from below, and the arrows indicate the direction of motion in (u,p) space.
The preceding discussion points Eo Ehe general behavioral phenomenon Ehat, if price is anWhell llt,:t--p(E) F p equilibriurn, rhere exist forces which wiLl reEurn iE to equilibrium. Indeed, the amounE of adjustment depends on how far away from equilibrium price happens to be.
where w(t) The rate of adjustment of price is thus Ehe distribuced and the long-term lrajecEory is a convoluEion of Past and future stalionary mark-ups apr(t):
T + --1. ,' I (t-s) p"(E) = (\' -\ ) -t0/ e' '--'apr1s)ds (4.4) An optimal control law in lhe present sense is one in which the firm adjusts co equilibriun by taking into consideraEion the entire planning horizon, discounting fucure stationary points eriEh a positive root and lreighting past mark-up points using the negacive root. If time c is large, ie., the firm is on a so-called curnpike, the Eransitory part in (4.2) becomes unimportanE (after a sufficient time initial condilions cease to matter) and the solution simplifies inlerest rate r will not affect e!di1iU.i,r*, since vl = 0 is noc a function of r. However, whenever r increases, the iso-profit lines must become steeper. The change i.n the slope of the equilibrium curve i = 0 depends on the sign of VlZ. Lf. Vl2 t 0, rhe adjustment P = u(P) to equiliSiium is retiiaea, but if V12 < 0, F' increases if lvl2l is large.
An increase-in marginal cosl or in the demand elasEicity increases equilibrium price. The rate of adjuscment is chereby also increased. FinaLly, the cosE of adjuscment V, plays an important roLe in how quickly the firm can adipt to changing conditions. If we consider an increase in lo22i, hence ot lv22l, due to a rise in the aversion Eo price changes, we find that the slope of the )r = 0 curve is raised. Thus, even as equilibrium price remains the same, adjustmen! to that point is acceleraEed if price-change sensilivily increases.
IV. APPROXII'IATION OF THE OPTIMAL PATI{
We take as starting point the linear exPansion (3.11) wich ap.(t) serving as a forcing funccion of the approximaEii opcimal control law. Thus, although che Euler equation in_(3.11) applies strictly speaking Eo a particular tiloe E, we now assume Ehaf the exPansion path is a function of time, but, to be truthful, only in a limited nanner. Any changes in r and a w111' for the moment, be conveniently ignored, only to be resullected laEer on, where such changes will be taken care of in a somewhat more ad hoc manner.
The roots of (3.10) have the symmetry ProPerty -+-r I +tr'=r l. <0<r<tr' A heuristic interpletation of the Earget F(t) can be based on an argument of quasi-nryopic behavior. If the firm were completely myopic it would consider only the presenE value of apm(t). In quasi-nyopic optimization the firm takes the mark-up values currenc a! each point of tigle and forms a convoluted target as the forward lead shown in (4.7).
The correspondence betereen che analysis in this section and the phase-diagram becomes evident if we differentiate (4.5) wi.!h Tespect Eo time i<tl = -r-tF(t) -p(E)l = F(F(t) -p(t)). (4.8) Clearly, as before the adjustnen! propertiee F(0) = 0 and Fr > 0 are preserved. We notice also thac the value to which price adjusts in phase space is no longer the simplified sEa!ionary monopoly mark-uP apbut the convolution shown in (4.7). lt we notr considiir the effects of changing inEeresc rates and changing selsitiviEy to price-variance, ne find that adjustmenc -). and the target must be revised. The roots of (3.10), our approximate Euler equacion, are determined by che discount rate r(t) and by the coefficient g wtrich is a function of model parameters embodied in V. A quick check nich (3.10) confirms the result of the phase diagram analysis for the general model, ie.,
As {n Sectlon III, the conclusLon is that an increaEe in the rate of dlscoun! tends !o speed up adjustnent if Vlr is negative and large in absolute value, while an ifiErease in a, brought about by lncreased costs, decreased demand elasticity, or an increased sensiclvity co price variation, will accelerate adjustEent. The siroilarity of equation (4.8) !o others that have been proposed as enpirical hypotheses for price \ adjuslment is deceprive. As noced, F(t) is not a current Eerm but. embodies all Ehe informaEion, Past and future, which the firm has available concerning ics cosc and demand slruclure. Even the adiustment rate which ordinarily is a consEanE is now deEerrnined by condicions affeccing coscs and opPortunities of the firrn. Given a changing environmenE, optimal behavior by the firm will imply concinual revision of the adjustment process. The task of the nexE seclion will be to find a suitable nay of exPresslng this phenomenon for empirical est imation.
Finally, in real-world applications decisions and measurements are di-screte. The If, however, we lel h = 1, lhe result in (4.10) is obtained. The normalizati-on of h = I will thus be assumed for quarEerly data.
V. SPECITICATION wElt;=h (1) 
